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1. INTRODUCTION 
The allocation of decision rights is an integral com-
ponent of designing organizational architecture 
(Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman 2001). Econo-
mists have long understood the importance of co-
locating decision authority with the knowledge that 
is valuable to those decisions. As early as 1945, 
Hayek highlighted the inability of centralized deci-
sion-makers to effectively solve organizational prob-
lems lower down in the hierarchy. More recently, 
Jensen and Meckling (1992) suggest that as long as 
agency problems are minimal, assigning decision 
rights to individuals, who have the decision-relevant 
knowledge, increases efficiency. 
Marketing scholars have presented similar argu-
ments in describing the allocation of pricing author-
ity within sales organizations. Lal (1986) makes the 
case that delegating pricing authority to the sales 
force will be more profitable than centralization 
because salespeople often possess superior informa-
tion about customer willingness-to-pay. Weinberg 
(1975) shows that salespeople, who are paid a com-
mission based on realized gross margin and who are 
given control over price, will set prices so as to  
maximize simultaneously their own income and the 
company’s profits.  
Surprisingly, despite these powerful theoretical 
arguments in favor of delegating pricing authority to 
the sales force, empirical work reveals a majority of 
sales organizations yielding little or no pricing au-
thority to their salespeople. In a study conducted by 
Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier (1979) in the hospi-
tal-supplies industry, for example, 29% of firms 
yield no pricing authority and 48% yield only lim-
ited pricing authority. Only a minority of respond-
ing firms, namely 23%, give full pricing authority to 
their salespeople. Moreover, firms that centralize 
pricing authority are actually found to be more prof-
itable than firms that delegate pricing authority.  
Broadly, our objective in this research is to shed 
light on the observed divergence between theory 
and practice. More specifically, our research goals 
are two-fold: (i) identify factors that could poten-
tially mitigate the optimality of delegating pricing 
authority to the sales force, and (ii) investigate the 
empirical validity of the proposed mitigating factors. 
In our research, we describe two mitigating factors 
that may cause centralization to be actually pre-
ferred over delegation. First, following the work of 
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Jensen and Meckling (1992), we posit that agency 
costs can potentially mitigate the benefits of delegat-
ing pricing authority to the sales force. Agency costs 
refer to the inefficiencies arising from a lack of per-
fect goal alignment between employees and owners, 
thereby lowering firm profit. The work by Joseph 
(2001) is particularly germane in this connection. 
His model reveals that salespeople have a tendency 
to make trade-offs between effort and price dis-
counting that are inconsistent with the profit objec-
tive of the firm. Interestingly, this type of agency 
cost is also of great concern to practitioners. Specifi-
cally, sales managers complain that price latitude 
often causes salespeople to take the path of least 
resistance, i.e., use discounting rather than expend 
effort on selling (Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 
1979, p. 26). Given the possibility of such inefficient 
trade-offs, firms may withhold pricing authority 
even as they sacrifice the benefits of price customi-
zation obtained via delegation. 
The second reason why centralization may be pre-
ferred to delegation pertains to the manner in which 
sales force control systems are designed. The design 
of control systems includes such elements as the 
choice of metrics utilized in the compensation plan, 
namely margins or sales, and the level of monitoring 
(Joseph and Thevaranjan 1998). Clearly, these con-
trol elements are designed not only to support the 
price delegation decision but also to respond to 
various other conditions facing the firm. For exam-
ple, in some scenarios, the firm may wish to avoid 
setting commissions based on margins because such 
an action could reveal the firm’s cost structure to the 
competition. This revelation could prove to be too 
costly from a strategic point of view (Churchill, 
Ford, and Walker 1997, p. 226). In such situations, a 
profit-maximizing firm is pushed towards centrali-
zation because incentives on sales provide no check 
on indiscriminate price discounting. Similarly, a 
firm faced with high monitoring costs may not be 
able to install an adequate number of supervisory 
personnel. This lack of supervision may prevent the 
firm from verifying if the salesperson is making the 
right trade-offs between effort and price; conse-
quently, here also, centralization is the best strategy. 
In short, our essential point here is that the decision 
to delegate pricing authority will be influenced by 
the extant control system. Consequently, any study 
that examines the issue of delegating pricing author-
ity to the sales force must explicitly take into ac-
count the nature of the overall control system. 
In our empirical research, we investigate the man-
ner in which pricing authority is delegated to the 
sales force in a sample of 222 German sales organi-
zations spanning multiple industries. Like Stephen-
son, Cron, and Frazier (1979), we find considerable 
heterogeneity across firms with respect to this deci-
sion. Interestingly, we find that a significant propor-
tion of firms, namely 28%, choose to yield no pric-
ing authority to the sales force. In these cases, price 
is determined exclusively by management. Another 
61% of the firms yield only limited pricing authority 
to their salespeople. Here, salespeople are allowed 
to set prices within a pre-specified range. Finally, 
only a relatively lower percentage of firms, namely 
11%, follow the theoretical prescription of providing 
their salespeople with full pricing authority. In these 
cases, salespeople are given the freedom to set any 
price above marginal cost. 
Our main empirical findings can be summarized as 
follows: The observed heterogeneity with respect to 
price delegation can be explained by the aforemen-
tioned mitigating factors. In particular, our proxies 
that identify conditions where firms are concerned 
about inefficient trade-offs between price delegation 
and effort are able to successfully predict the likeli-
hood of price delegation. In addition, the nature of 
the control system also predicts the likelihood of 
price delegation. 
Overall, these findings offer a more refined under-
standing of the price delegation decision. Early work 
in the marketing literature suggests that price dele-
gation will invariably improve firm profits (Lal 
1986; Weinberg 1975). The practitioner-oriented 
literature, on the other hand, has generally been 
more circumspect about delegating pricing author-
ity to the sales force. For example, based on their 
consulting experience, Dolan and Simon (1996) 
comment that it seems to be better to err on the 
restrictive side, i.e., offer less pricing authority ra-
ther than too much pricing authority. They also 
report the practitioner sentiment that “letting the 
sales force set prices is about the same as hiring a 
fox to guard the hen house.” Clearly, the mitigating 
factors proposed in this research have the potential 
to reconcile these divergent prescriptions. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following 
manner: In the next section, we review the literature 
and derive our hypotheses. We then explain our 
empirical strategy and describe the data and meas-
ures utilized in our empirical research. Next, we 
present our empirical findings and discuss the main 
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implications. Finally, we summarize our contribu-
tions and conclude by outlining directions for future 
research. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Literature Review 
Joseph (2001) considers the impact of two forces 
that could potentially influence the optimality of 
price delegation. On the one hand, providing pricing 
authority to individual salespeople empowers them 
to use their superior information about customer 
willingness-to-pay and thereby conclude a greater 
number of transactions. On the other hand, provid-
ing the salesperson with pricing authority could lead 
to sub-optimal trade-offs between effort and price 
discounting. Given these opposing considerations, 
Joseph's primary objective is to examine the net 
effect of these two forces in determining the optimal 
level of pricing authority. His analysis reveals that 
limiting pricing authority can, in some environ-
ments, reduce the sub-optimal trade-off between 
price discounting and effort. In effect, limiting pric-
ing authority forces the salesperson to expend 
greater effort on prospecting because shirking on 
this task cannot be offset by price discounting. As 
such, the benefit obtained from inducing greater 
effort on prospecting outweighs the loss arising 
from the inability to customize prices.1 
Of course, other work in marketing has also exam-
ined the price delegation decision. Bhardwaj (2001) 
considers the strategic impact of the price delega-
tion decision. In particular, he examines how com-
petition impacts the price delegation decision. Our 
investigation differs from his analysis in that he 
does not consider the price-customization advan-
tages of price delegation. That is, the issue of cus-
tomizing prices across customers is not considered 
in his model – when the rep has pricing authority, 
he (or she) sets a single price for the entire market. 
Mishra and Prasad (2004) also consider the issue of 
price delegation and conclude that centralized pric-
ing performs at least as well as price delegation. 
                                                             
1 From a technical point of view, Joseph (2001) obtains these 
effects because he allows the effort devoted to prospecting to 
influence the type of customer (high valuation or low valua-
tion) that the salesperson encounters. This is in contrast to 
Lal’s work wherein the price sensitivity of the sales response 
function is better observed by the salesperson, but not influ-
enced by the effort choices of the salesperson. 
Mishra and Prasad (2005) demonstrate similar 
implications in a competitive setting. Although this 
is in contrast to Lal’s (1986) result, it arises because 
Mishra and Prasad assume a different timing of 
information. In particular, in their work, the private 
information of the rep is garnered at the time of 
contracting; consequently, an appropriate contract 
is able to elicit this information. In contrast to the 
efforts of Mishra and Prasad, we follow the work of 
Lal (1986) and consider a context where the private 
information is obtained after the time of contracting 
when salespeople actually call on their clients. 
2.2 Development of Hypotheses  
As suggested previously, there are two mitigating 
factors which may negate the price-customization 
advantages of price delegation, namely agency costs 
and the overall nature of the control system. We 
next develop hypotheses pertaining to these two 
factors.  
Impact of Agency Costs on Price Delegation 
Since our hypotheses here depend heavily on the 
work of Joseph (2001), it is instructive to review it 
in some detail. In his model, the market consists of 
two segments: A and B. Customers belonging to 
Segment A have reservation values that are inde-
pendently distributed and come from the uniform 
distribution [1-, 2-]. Customers belonging to 
Segment B have reservation values that are also 
independently distributed but come from the uni-
form distribution [0, 1]. Evidently, there is some 
overlap between the two segments, A and B. In par-
ticular, there are some customers in both segments 
whose valuations lie in the interval [1-, 1]. The pa-
rameter  thus represents the overlap between the 
two segments. Its expected values will be greater 
than 0 but substantially less than 1. Obviously, cus-
tomers in Segment A comprise the firm’s target 
segment because they tend to have higher reserva-
tion values in general. As such, the firm will encour-
age the salesperson to identify and pursue custom-
ers belonging to this segment (prospecting). Now, 
high values of suggest that the two segments 
merge with respect to their reservation values which 
is likely to be the case in a highly competitive envi-
ronment. In particular, due to the availability of 
several substitute goods, the reservation values of 
both segments converge. In contrast, low values of  
describe a distinct segment that is willing to pay 
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higher prices for the firm’s offering which is more 
characteristic for a low competitive landscape be-
cause of the absence of alternative suppliers. Fol-
lowing these explanations,  is interpreted as a 
measure of competitive intensity. 
In this context, the effort expended by the sales-
person is assumed to impact the quality of prospect-
ing. Specifically, as the salesperson expends greater 
effort on prospecting, a greater fraction of the cus-
tomers encountered by the salesperson are drawn 
from Segment A. This is because the more time the 
salesperson devotes to market analysis in terms of 
identifying potential customers based on demo-
graphic or situational factors, the higher the likeli-
hood that potential customers are classified cor-
rectly as Segment A customers. Clearly,  can take 
on values between 0 (minimum effort) and 1 
(maximum effort). Hence, given effort level  on 
prospecting and a cohort of N customers, N cus-
tomers are drawn from Segment A.  
Since [0,1], the remaining N (1- ) customers are 
drawn from Segment B. Within the model, the pa-
rameter  scales the effort cost of prospecting, which 
is expressed as 	.2 Clearly,  determines how ex-
pensive prospecting effort is – a given level of pros-
pecting effort incurs greater effort cost in those en-
vironments where  is higher. 
Following this analysis, the main insight offered by 
Joseph (2001) is as follows: He finds that price del-
egation is not optimal in all parts of the parameter 
space. Specifically, for a given value of the competi-
tive intensity parameter, , the optimality of delegat-
ing pricing authority varies nonmonotonically with 
the effort cost of following a high-quality prospect-
ing strategy. In particular, when is relatively high 
or relatively low, delegating pricing authority to the 
sales force is the optimal strategy. However, when  
takes on intermediate values, limiting pricing au-
thority is the optimal strategy (please see basis for 
H1a arrow in Figure 1, taken from Joseph (2001). 
The intuition behind this finding is as follows: When 
 is relatively low, the salesperson is willing to invest 
effort on prospecting because prospecting is not that 
expensive in terms of effort costs. In this situation, 
there is no divergence in preferences between the 
firm and the salesperson with respect to the amount 
of effort that ought to be devoted to prospecting. As 
                                                             
2 Effort cost is the monetary equivalent of the disutility in-
curred from effort (see also Basu, Lal, Srinivasan, and Stae-
lin 1985). 
such, the firm yields pricing authority to the sales-
person in order to obtain the benefits of price cus-
tomization. Similarly, when  is relatively high, both 
the firm and salesperson are in agreement that not 
much effort should be devoted to prospecting – this 
activity is expensive in terms of effort costs. As such, 
here also, the firm yields pricing authority to the 
salesperson in order to obtain the benefits of price 
customization. However, when  takes on interme-
diate values, the salesperson’s preferred trade-off 
between effort and price is different from that of the 
firm’s. In particular, the salesperson prefers to sub-
stitute price discounting for effort whereas the firm 
prefers that this substitution not be done. Thus, in 
this instance, the firm is better off limiting the ex-
tent of pricing authority. This limitation, in turn, 
forces the salesperson to invest a sufficient amount 
of effort on prospecting. 




For our purposes, the model analyzed by Joseph 
(2001) can be examined closely to obtain an 
additional insight. Specifically, by looking at the 
output of the model, it is also apparent that for a 
given value of the parameter , the optimality of 
delegating pricing authority varies nonmonotoni-
cally with the competitive intensity parameter, . 
Thus, when  is relatively high or relatively low, 
delegating pricing authority to the sales force is the 
optimal strategy. However, when  takes on inter-
mediate values, limiting pricing authority is the 
optimal strategy (please see basis for H1b arrow in 
Figure 1). 
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Although this is a new insight, the intuition behind 
it is very similar to the previous case. When  is rela-
tively small, the salesperson is willing to invest effort 
on prospecting because the degree of competitive 
intensity is small and any effort expended on pros-
pecting yields Segment A customers who are, in this 
instance, distinct from Segment B customers. As 
such, there is no divergence in preferences between 
the firm and the salesperson with respect to the 
amount of effort that ought to be devoted to pros-
pecting. Consequently, the firm yields pricing au-
thority to the salesperson in order to obtain the 
benefits of price customization. Similarly, when  is 
relatively large, competitive intensity is high and 
both the firm and salesperson are in agreement that 
not much effort should be devoted to prospecting. 
Given the high overlap between the segments, pros-
pecting does not yield customers who are willing to 
pay much higher prices than Segment B customers. 
As such, here also, the firm yields pricing authority 
to the salesperson in order to obtain the benefits of 
price customization. However, when  takes on in-
termediate values, the salesperson’s preferred trade-
off between effort and price is different from that of 
the firm’s. Again, the salesperson prefers to substi-
tute price discounting for effort whereas the firm 
prefers that this substitution not be done. Thus, in 
this instance, the firm is better off limiting the ex-
tent of pricing authority. This limitation, in turn, 
ensures that the salesperson invests sufficient 
amounts of effort on prospecting. 
Overall, this discussion suggests that the price dele-
gation decision will vary non-monotonically in the 
parameters  and . This leads to our first set of hy-
pothesis: 
 
H1a:   When prospecting is relatively expensive or 
relatively inexpensive in terms of effort 
costs, agency costs are muted and the like-
lihood of delegating pricing authority is ex-
pected to be high. However, when prospect-
ing is moderately expensive in terms of ef-
fort costs, agency costs are salient and the 
likelihood of delegating pricing authority is 
expected to be low. 
 
H1b:   When competitive intensity is relatively low 
or relatively high, agency costs are muted 
and the likelihood of delegating pricing au-
thority is expected to be high. However, 
when competitive intensity takes on inter-
mediate values, agency costs are salient and 
the likelihood of delegating pricing author-
ity is expected to be low. 
Impact of Control System Elements on Price 
Delegation 
As mentioned previously, the design of the control 
system is likely to be influenced by several factors. 
Typically, the control system is designed not only to 
support the price delegation decision but also to 
accommodate various conditions facing the firm 
such as task programmability, environmental un-
certainty, risk preferences, etc (Basu, Lal, Sriniva-
san, and Staelin 1985; Anderson and Oliver 1987). 
Two important elements of the control system in-
clude the performance metrics employed by the firm 
(sales or margin) and the extent of managerial mon-
itoring. First, consider the impact of utilizing incen-
tives based on gross margins. We posit that the use 
of incentives based on gross margins in the control 
system will increase the likelihood of delegating 
pricing authority. This is because offering incentives 
on gross margins (as opposed to sales revenue) 
ensures that any reduction in price strongly affects 
the compensation of the salesperson. To illustrate 
this point, consider a product with a list price of € 
100 and marginal cost of € 90. If the salesperson is 
compensated on sales with a commission rate of 1%, 
a sale at list price yields € 1 in income. Discounting 
the product to € 95 leads to commission income of 
€ 0.95 – a decrease of only 5 cents. On the other 
hand, if the salesperson is compensated on realized 
gross margins with commission rate of 10%, a sale 
at list price yields € 1 in income. Discounting the 
product to € 95 leads to commission income of € 
0.50, a decrease of 50%. Clearly, incentives based on 
realized gross margins can substantially reduce the 
motivation to indiscriminately lower price.  
Next, consider the impact of the cost of monitoring 
(Joseph and Thevaranjan 1998). Monitoring can 
significantly reduce the ability of the salesperson to 
engage in sub-optimal trade-offs between effort and 
price. In other words, managerial monitoring can 
ensure that the salesperson does not misuse pricing 
authority. This discussion involving the control 
system leads to our second set of hypotheses: 
 
H2a:   The utilization of incentives based on gross 
margins in the control system will increase 
the likelihood of delegating pricing author-
ity to the sales force.  
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H2b:   A high intensity of monitoring in the con-
trol system will increase the likelihood of 
delegating pricing authority to the sales 
force. 
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY, DATA, 
MEASURES, AND ESTIMATION 
EQUATION 
Empirical Strategy 
We now describe the essential features of our em-
pirical strategy. Guided by the trade-offs contained 
within our first hypothesis, we first identify condi-
tions wherein sub-optimal trade-offs between effort 
and price are likely to occur. We then expect these 
conditions to predict instances wherein firms are 
likely to restrict pricing authority. Our second hy-
pothesis is tested in straightforward fashion by ex-
amining the impact of control system elements on 
the likelihood of price delegation. 
We employ proxies to test the effects described 
within our hypotheses. Broadly, in this approach, a 
case is made for an observable variable to represent 
the conditions described within the hypotheses (see, 
for example, the empirical work by Coughlan and 
Narasimhan 1992 on sales-force compensation 
plans). Then, the data are analyzed to examine if the 
proxies behave in a manner suggested by the pro-
posed conceptualization. 
Data 
We utilize data collected by Krafft (1999) in his 
study pertaining to sales-force control systems. His 
data were obtained via a mail survey of 1,099 chief 
sales executives of German sales forces (for details, 
see Krafft 1999 or Krafft, Lal, and Albers 2004). A 
second mailing followed the initial mailing four to 
six weeks later. The survey was completed approxi-
mately twelve weeks after the first mailing and re-
sulted in a response rate of 24.6%. This sample is 
characterized by large firms and comprises observa-
tions from the financial-services sector, pharmaceu-
tical-goods firms, industrial-goods companies, and 
the consumer-goods industry. The average annual 
sales volume in the data set is € 148.9 million. A 
comparison of the sample with other German stud-
ies shows that this data set corresponds well with 
typical levels of annual sales, sales-force size, age, 
tenure, and total pay. 
Dependent Variable 
The survey measures the extent of pricing authority 
given to the sales force via the question, “The gen-
eral pricing authority of your salespeople is” fol-
lowed by the choices, “0: No pricing authority 
(prices are determined by the management,” “1: 
Restricted (salesperson determines prices within a 
pre-specified range),” and “2: Unrestricted (sales-
person has full authority).” 
Proxies for  and  
As discussed previously, we employ proxies to cap-
ture the hypothesized effects of the parameters  
and . With respect to the parameter 
the survey 
provides information about the fraction of time 
spent on: (i) sales calls, (ii) activities such as call 
preparation, merchandising, and service, (iii) travel 
/ waiting. Recall that the parameter  reflects the 
effort cost of perfectly targeting a customer in the 
firm’s target segment. While items (ii) and (iii) do 
not strictly measure prospecting, they are a gauge of 
the host of activities required to identify and pursue 
target customers. Sales processes that require high-
er levels of call preparation, merchandising, service, 
and even travel/waiting all imply greater effective 
cost to identify and pursue a prospect in the firm’s 
target segment. As such, we employ the sum of (ii) 
and (iii) to serve as a proxy for . 
From a measurement point of view, however, the 
response pertaining to the proportion of time spent 
on sales calls (item (i)) is likely to be the most accu-
rate. This is because it is often recorded in call logs. 
In addition, sales managers are likely to be very 
conscious of this fraction since it is frequently used 
for decisions regarding sales-force sizing and spe-
cialization (see, for example, Moriarty and Swartz 
1986). Thus, we measure the effort cost of prospect-
ing-type activities by 100 less the fraction of time 
devoted to the actual sales call. In our sample, the 
fraction of effort devoted to prospecting varies from 
30% to 100%. The two observations that take values 
greater than 95% are likely to be described by sup-
port salespeople rather than field salespeople. Nev-
ertheless, they also serve as useful observations to 
test our expectation here that the firm would like to 
offer pricing authority to the sales force. This is be-
cause the opportunity to make sub-optimal trade-
offs between effort and price simply does not arise. 
With respect to the parameter , the survey 
measures INTENSITY OF COMPETITION via the 
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question: “How strong do you perceive the intensity 
of competition in your market segment?” The re-
sponses to this question are coded via a 7-point 
semantic differential scale going from Low to High. 
 
Utilization of Incentives Based on Gross 
Margins 
The survey also reports the utilization of incentives 
based on gross margins. In straightforward fashion, 
we employ a dummy variable which takes the value 
1 if such incentives are utilized, 0 otherwise. Overall, 
in our sample of firms, only about 18% of firms em-
ploy incentives based on gross margins although 
approximately 72% offer some amount of pricing 
authority to their salespeople. This empirical finding 
underscores the importance of including elements 
of the control system. 
Intensity of Monitoring 
In straightforward fashion, we measure the intensity 
of monitoring via the number of salespeople super-
vised by the sales manager. We assume that the 
greater the number of salespeople monitored by a 
sales manager, the lower is the intensity of monitor-
ing. Since we further suppose that the impact of a 
unit increase in sales-force size is larger at relatively 
small sales-force sizes – and hence an r-shaped 
relation is expected – we use a square-root trans-
formation for this variable. 
Calls to Close 
For proper specification, we also include the num-
ber of calls required to close a sale in our model. 
Firms characterized by long selling cycles are likely 
to be promoting products that are intrinsically com-
plex. Such products may inherently require a good 
deal of negotiation. For this reason, we expect 
length of the selling cycle to increase the likelihood 
of delegating pricing authority to the sales force (see 
Stephenson, Cron, and Frazier 1979, p. 21). CALLS 
TO CLOSE is measured via the question, “How 
many sales calls are necessary in cases of first pur-
chases to close a sale?”  
Estimation Model 
Following our discussion, we specify the following 
model for estimation purposes:  




(2)     with zi  = 0i   +  1 × PROSPECTING FRACTION + 
 2 × (PROSPECTING FRACTION) 2 + 
                           3 × INTENSITY OF COMPETITION + 
                           4 × (INTENSITY OF COMPETITION) 2 + 
                           5 × UTILIZATION OF GROSS MARGIN INCENTIVES +  
 6 × INTENSITY OF MONITORING + 
 7 × CALLS TO CLOSE   
and i = category of delegated pricing  
authority (no vs. limited vs. full)  
 
The powered terms in equation (2) allow us to test 
the non-monotonic relationships developed in hy-
potheses H1a and H1b. Following our hypotheses, we 
expect 1 < 0, 2 > 0, 3 < 0, 4 > 0, 5 > 0, and 
6 > 0. 
4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 provides the overall characteristics of our 
sample with respect to the dependent and inde-
pendent measures (by industry). Table 2 reports the 
correlation matrix of our analysis variables. Table 2 
suggests that multi-collinearity – with the exception 
of the correlations between powered and dedicated 
non-powered terms – is not an issue in our study. 
Despite the multi-collinearity between powered and 
non-powered terms we integrate the squared terms 
into our model because both terms add significantly 
to the overall explanatory power of our model. As 
compared to a reduced model (with Log Likelihood 
= -181.43) that does not include the variables 
(PROSPECTING FRACTION)2 and (INTENSITY 
OF COMPETITION)2, the model that includes all of 
our independent variables has significantly higher 
fit (the improvement 2 = 8.615, p<.05). This signifi-
cant improvement confirms our assumption that 
powered and non-powered terms of PROS-
PECTING FRACTION and INTENSITY OF 
COMPETITION are necessary to estimate the de-
pendent variable. We note that including powered 
terms does not change the remaining variables of 
                                                             
3 For i=0, equation (1) describes the probability that firms dele-
gate full or limited (vs. no) pricing authority. For i=1, equation 
(1) describes the probability that firms delegate full vs. limited 
or no pricing authority. 
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our model with regard to direction or significance 
levels of the coefficients. 
Table 1: Means Across Industries  
(standard deviations of independent 
variables by industry in parentheses) 
Table 2: Correlation matrix of independent 
variables (p-values in parentheses) 
 
We next report findings from running our model as 
specified in (1) and (2). Since the dependent variable 
is ordinal scaled and its potential categories can be 
ordered, we employ an ordered regression model for 
our estimation (Long and Freese 2006). We use a 
logit model because the logistic distribution fits our 
assumed distribution of the residuals best. Further 
reasons for preferring a logit model to probit are 
that both distributions tend to lead to similar re-
sults, and probit has found rather limited applica-
tion in association with ordered models while logit 
models are widely used (Greene 2003). The findings 
of our estimation are reported in Table 3, and we 
note that – with the exception of the variable 
UTILIZATION OF GROSS MARGIN INCENTIVES 
– all coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level or 
higher. 
As hypothesized, we do find that the fraction of 
effort devoted to prospecting has a non-monotonic 
impact on the probability of delegating pricing au-
thority to the sales force. Firms at which the sales 
process is characterized by relatively low or rela-
tively high cost of prospecting tend to delegate pric-
ing authority to the sales force. On the other hand, 
firms at which the sales process is characterized by 
intermediate levels for the cost of prospecting tend 
to limit the extent of pricing authority given to their 
salespeople. Similarly, we find that the intensity of 
competition displays the hypothesized effects. Spe-
cifically, we find that competitive intensity first de-
creases and then increases the extent of pricing 
authority given to the sales force. Taken together, 
these findings provide strong support for our pri- 
mary hypothesis that agency costs can mitigate the  
 
price-customization advantages of delegation. 
The hypothesized effect that the use of incentives 
based on gross margins increases the likelihood of 
delegating pricing authority to the sales force is not 
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One might speculate that this finding is affected by 
the categorical nature of our dependent variable – 
our largest sub-sample of sales forces with restrict-
ted price delegation entails cases with low to high 
(but not full) degrees of pricing authority. The non-
significant effect could then be a consequence of a 
leveling effect: firms with high degrees of delegation 
that base their incentives on gross margins, are 
within the same category as firms with very re-
stricted pricing authority that do not apply incen-
tives based on gross margins. This argument can be 
underlined by our results from a logistic regression 
where only cases with full vs. no delegation are con-
sidered. Though not significant due to low sample 
size (n=87), firms using incentives based on gross 
margins are more likely to fully delegate pricing 
authority (see Table 4). 
Table 3: Determinants of Delegating Pricing 
Authority (three groups, ordered 
regression, p-values in parentheses) 
Variable Expected Sign Estimate 
Prospecting Fraction - - 0.148** 
(0.037) 
(Prospecting Fraction) 2 + + 0.0013** 
(0.023) 
Intensity of Competition - - 1.594*** 
(0.009) 
(Intensity of  
Competition) 2 
+ + 0.147** 
(0.013) 
Utilization of Gross  
Margin Incentives 
+ - 0.008 
(0.492) 
Intensity of Monitoring 
(R, Square root trans-
formation) 
- - 0.569*** 
(0.001) 
Calls to Close + + 0.208*** 
(0.000) 
 
Log likelihood    -177.123 
χ2 (Likelihood-Ratio Test)   40.567*** 
                     (degrees of freedom: 7) 
Nagelkerke    0.2 
 
***: Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
**: Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*: Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
R: reversed measure 
N=222 
 
Next, we find that the intensity of monitoring also 
has a significant impact on the probability of dele-
gating pricing authority to the sales force. Firms that 
monitor their salespeople intensely are relatively 
more likely to delegate pricing authority to the sales 
force. As postulated, these findings suggest that the 
nature of the control system has a significant bear-
ing on the price delegation decision. 
To account for the fact that the nature of the selling 
process may also influence the extent of pricing 
authority delegated to the sales force, we integrated 
the variable CALLS TO CLOSE as a covariate. As 
expected, we find that firms characterized by long 
selling cycles are more likely to delegate pricing 
authority to their salespeople.  
Table 4: Determinants of Delegating Pricing 
Authority (two groups, logistic regression, 
p-values in parentheses) 
Variable Expected Sign Estimate 
Prospecting Fraction - - 0.269 
(0.103) 




- - 2.726*** 
(0.005) 
(Intensity of  
Competition) 2 
+ + 0.258*** 
(0.009) 
Utilization of Gross  
Margin Incentives 
+ - 1.114 
(0.136) 
Intensity of Monitoring  
(R, Square root trans-
formation) 
- - 1.311*** 
(0.006) 
Calls to Close + + 0.467*** 
(0.001) 
 
Log likelihood    -35.13 
χ2 (Likelihood-Ratio Test)   32.234*** 
    (degrees of freedom: 7) 
Nagelkerke    0.4 
 
***: Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
**: Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*: Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
R: reversed measure 
N=87 
 
Finally, we also report findings from estimating our 
model with logistic regression by excluding the 
middle group (delegating restricted price authority) 
and findings from ordered regression estimation for 
equally sized groups. The logistic regression (results 
are reported in Table 4) is based on zero (n=63) vs. 
full (n=24) delegation and confirms our findings. 
Due to limited sample size, some of the coefficients 
are not significant, but in the proposed direction. In 
Table 5, we report results from a balanced sample 
(24 cases for no, restricted and full delegation – for 
no and restricted delegation, we took a random 
sample of the 63 and 135 cases). Again, the results 
are quite similar. We only find some non-significant 
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relationships because of limited sample sizes. Over-
all, the results of the two additional estimations 
suggest that the findings of our model are robust 
and thus confirm that our results as reported in 
Table 3 are reliable.  
Table 5: Determinants of Delegating Pricing 
Authority (three groups of same size, 
ordered regression, p-values in 
parentheses) 
Variable Expected Sign Estimate 
Prospecting Fraction - - 0.073 
(0.342) 
(Prospecting Fraction) 2 + + 0.001 
(0.253) 
Intensity of Competition - - 4.607*** 
(0.004) 
(Intensity of  
Competition) 2 
+ + 0.454*** 
(0.003) 
Utilization of Gross  
Margin Incentives 
+ - 0.305 
(0.380) 
Intensity of Monitoring  
(R, Square root trans-
formation) 
- - 0.412* 
(0.089) 
Calls to Close + + 0.486*** 
(0.001) 
 
Log likelihood    -57.105 
χ2 (Likelihood-Ratio Test)   42.605*** 
    (degrees of freedom: 7) 
Nagelkerke    0.5 
 
***: Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
**: Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*: Significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed) 
R: reversed measure 
N=72 
 
5. CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
In very many markets, customers vary significantly 
in their valuation of the firm’s offerings. In these 
cases, managers need to decide whether and how 
much pricing authority should be delegated to the 
sales force. Our work illuminates the economic 
trade-offs involved in this decision. 
Substantively, our empirical findings suggest that 
although price delegation can yield tremendous 
advantages, this latitude gives rise to the possibility 
of a specific type of agency cost, namely, the sub-
optimal substitution of selling effort by price dis-
counting. A key finding in our empirical work is that 
firms are less likely to delegate pricing authority 
when these agency costs are likely to be fairly sub-
stantial. This finding demonstrates that the price-
customization advantages of price delegation need 
to be weighed against the magnitude of the agency 
costs that are likely to emerge. In our empirical 
work, we find that these agency costs can be sub-
stantial when the proportion of effort devoted to 
prospecting-type activities and the degree of com-
petitive intensity take on intermediate levels. Clear-
ly, these conditions are not transparent; conse-
quently, these implications have the potential to be 
fairly insightful. 
A second substantive finding pertains to the impact 
of the control system on the price delegation deci-
sion. We find that firms that closely monitor their 
sales personnel can minimize sub-optimal substitu-
tion of selling effort by price discounting. Thus, 
these firms can potentially benefit from delegating 
pricing authority to their sales personnel. Con-
versely, firms that employ low levels of supervision 
may restrict pricing authority because they suffer 
from an inability to limit agency costs. These firms 
thus cannot take advantage of the price-custo-
mization advantages of delegation. 
Based on the assumption that a firm’s decision 
against price delegation is influenced by some miti-
gating factors that make not delegating optimal for 
them, our research suggests that the decision to 
delegate pricing authority yields the advantages of 
price-customization benefits but is fraught with 
agency costs. However, to get a broader understand-
ing of the optimality of the price delegation decision, 
future research should more thoroughly investigate 
the relationship between the degree of pricing au-
thority and performance. Furthermore, additional 
research is required to verify the impact of the miti-
gating factors with more precise dependent vari-
ables and direct measures rather than the proxies 
that we employ in the current research. Additional 
research is also required to examine how technology 
(e.g., sales-force automation) can impact the delega-
tion decision. Finally, future research could also 
examine heterogeneity in the price delegation deci-
sion within a salesforce (by levels of experience, 
product lines, etc). We hope our research will stimu-
late such efforts. 
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